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THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: WHY IS
RECIPROCITY ANTICOMPETITIVE?
WESLEY J. LIEBELER*

"Tie-ins may also at times be beneficial to the economy."1
"The analogy [of reciprocal buying] to a tie-in agreement has impressed all
observers." 2
Having gathered most of the material for this Symposium, the Editors
of this Review asked me to comment briefly on the subject of reciprocity.
Time does not permit an exhaustive analysis, much of which has in any
event already been done by others. 3 It is a sad but revealing comment on the
nature of communication among those who concern themselves with antitrust matters, that the issues raised in the most complete, intelligible and
analytically sound pieces so far written on the subject of reciprocity 4 have
not been discussed to any significant degree in any of the other articles in
this Symposium. 5 It seems as though reciprocity is bad because (almost)
everyone assumes that it is; it is bad because the folklore, continually affirmed
from on High, says so. It is very much like a bad case of the Emperor's New
Clothes.
In such a context the hope of getting anyone to meet directly the issues
involved may be wan indeed. I shall, nevertheless, try to show, primarily in
the context of FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,6 that reciprocity is surely
not always anticompetitive. Indeed, it may be positively beneficial to the
competitive process, even though, like most aspects of competition, it may
discomfort some competitors.
First, what are the evils which, as the mythology of antitrust hands it
down, flow from reciprocal dealing? The practice has been denounced as
"one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws
are aimed." 7 This is apparently so because reciprocity "results in 'an irrelevant and alien factor' . . . intruding into the choice among competing
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., Macalester College,
1953; J.D., University of Chicago, 1957.
1 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting).
2 Kestenbaum, Is Reciprocity Illegal, Immoral or Just Fattening?, 22 REcoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 576, 579 (1967).
8See Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Comment, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020
(1967). See also Coase, Working Paper II: The Conglomerate Merger (working paper for
the Task Force on Productivity and Competition), 2 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REv., Spring
1969, at 45; Stigler, Working Paper IV: Reciprocity, id. at 51.
4 Stigler, supra note 3.
5 These pieces are cited and some of the issues they raise are mentioned in Backman,
supra at p. 90.
8380 U.S. 592 (1965).
7 380 U.S. at 594.
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products, creating at the least 'a priority on the business at equal prices.' "s
Adumbrators have isolated and identified coercive, contractual and accommodative reciprocity. 9 We are treated to the spectre of "reciprocity effect."' 0
Congratulating itself on what it has done already, in the name of protecting
"competition," the Antitrust Division announces plans to move against
"second-line reciprocity."'" Finally, and most recently, we are advised that:
Undoubtedly the most dangerous form of leverage in the concentric merger
context is reciprocity. Where the potential to use it is present we may
assume that without some form of prevention it will be used. The only
question of consequence about reciprocity is how to stop it.12
But should reciprocity be stopped in a situation like that involved in
ConsolidatedFoods? The facts should be familiar to all by now: the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) attacked a merger of Consolidated Foods, which
owned food processing plants and "a network of wholesale and retail
food stores,"' 3 and Gentry, Inc., which made dehydrated onion and garlic.
The Court said that Consolidated was "a substantial purchaser of the
products of food processors who in turn purchase dehydrated onion and
4
garlic for use in preparing and packaging their food.'
The decision was bottomed on the proposition that Consolidated had
buying power which provided both the "leverage" to force those from whom
it bought to purchase Gentry's garlic and onions and the power "'to foreclose
competition from a substantial share of the markets for dehydrated onion
and garlic.' "15 In the language of the Commission, adopted by Mr. Justice
Douglas, Gentry would have "an unfair advantage over competitors enabling
it to make sales that otherwise might not have been made."16 The merger
supposedly increased " 'obstacles to the creation of genuinely competitive
conditions in an oligopolistic industry.' "17
It seems profitable to focus initially on the nature of the dehydrated
onion and garlic market rather than to dwell on the nature of Consolidated's
"buying power." In that market, Gentry and its only significant competitor,
Basic, accounted for almost 90 percent of total industry sales. At the time
there were only two other firms in the industry.' 8 Given the structure of
the industry it would not strain credulity to assume that in making price
8 Id.

9 See, e.g., Kestenbaum, supra note 2, at 579-80.
10 See, e.g., Rigler, Conglomerate Mergers-Reciprocity,
Real and Potential, as a
Basis for Attack, infra at p. 580.
11 So-called "second-line reciprocity" appears to be that situation which exists when
a firm trys to convince a supplier to buy from a customer. See AN'TIRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 447, at A-5 (Feb. 3, 1970).
12 Solomon, The Concentric Merger and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, infra at p. 559.
13 380 U.S. at 593.
141d. at 595.
15 Id. at 593 (quoting FTC).
16 Id. at 597.
17 Id. (quoting FTC)
is Id. at 595.
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determinations, each firm would take account of the other's reaction. We
had, in short, almost the classic duopoly market structure.
Economic analysis of this type of market suggests that the firms will act
jointly in an attempt to maximize profits, even in the absence of any cartel
agreement.' 9 In such a situation prices will almost certainly be higher than
costs; supercompetitive profits will be earned even though they may be
limited to some extent by the threat of entry. 20 Both Basic and Gentry would
most likely be something less than eager to initiate open price cuts, on the
theory that their individual demand curves would be highly inelastic below
the going price.2 ' This is based on the plausible assumption that any open
price cut by one firm would be almost immediately matched by the other.
Because of this the firm initiating such a cut could not realistically expect to
increase its market share at the expense of the other. The net result, therefore, of an open price cut by either firm would be a revenue loss to both
firms with market shares remaining about the same. Accordingly, we would
22
not expect such open price cuts to be made.
An additional factor militating against an open price cut is that it
would have to be granted to all buyers. To determine the effect of any such
cut on its net revenue the firm would have to deduct (1) the revenue loss
that would result from reducing prices in respect of sales which could have
been made at the higher price from (2) the increase in revenue that would
result from the additional sales that could be expected to flow from the
general reduction in prices. 23 Obviously, at some point the decrease in
revenue following any price cut (1) should equal the increase (2). If the
firms were behaving rationally we would, of course, expect their price and
output to be such that their net revenue position could not be improved
either by increasing or decreasing prices across the board, i.e., the decrease (1)
and the increase (2) that would result from any price reduction would be
24
equal.
If we are correct so far, we find a pre-merger situation in which the
19 See, e.g., R. LEFrwicH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 214-16 (3d
ed. 1966); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 228-29 (rev. ed. 1952).
20 See G. STIGLER, supra note 19, at 231-32; Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly
and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 448 (1949); Liebeler, Toward A Consumer's Antitrust Law: The Federal Trade Commission and Vertical Mergers in the Cement Industry,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1153, 1175 n.80 (1968).
21Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939);
Professor Sweezy's views and the nature of the oligopolist's demand curve are discussed
in E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 103-08 (1968).
22 This view seems to be generally accepted by the FTC, or at least by its staff.
See FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS & VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUsTRY 59 (1966); BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS
324 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
28 This is, of course, the basis of the concept of marginal revenue. See, e.g., A.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIvERsITY ECONOMICS 109 (2d ed. 1967).
24 This is only to say that a firm with a downward sloping demand curve could
rationally be expected to vary output until marginal cost equalled marginal revenue.
See, e.g., id. at 111-12.
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prices of dehydrated onion and garlic almost certainly exceed their costs of
production. There is some competition between Basic and Gentry, probably
also involving the two much smaller members of the industry as it
then existed, but that competition is primarily in terms of quality, service
and the like. Open price competition is severely inhibited because any
initial price cut by either major firm would immediately be matched by
the other and would have to be given to all buyers.
Gentry (or Basic for that matter) could improve its net revenue position
if it could find some way to reduce prices to new customers without affecting
the prices it charged to its old customers. 25 Gentry would also be happy if it
could make those cuts in such a way that they were not immediately
apparent to Basic.26 Gentry would be happier still if those cuts could be
made in such a way that Basic could, even after observing them, not match
them without imposing some cost on itself that Gentry did not have to
27
incur in connection with its initial reduction.
It appears that just such a device is provided by reciprocal buying.
To keep matters as simple as possible, let us assume a hypothetical
maker of garlicky pickles (GP), who has been buying for $.10 a pound from
Basic garlic that it costs both Basic and Gentry $.06 a pound to produce and
deliver to him. For simplicity, let us start with the assumption that Consolidated does not exercise any buying power and that GP has been selling
his pickles to a competitor of Consolidated for $5.00 per case, the competitive
price for all similar delicacies. Assume also that five pounds of garlic go into
the manufacture of each case of pickles.
It seems clear that, all other things being equal, Consolidated-Gentry
could induce our pickle maker to shift his garlic purchases from Basic to
Gentry by offering to pay $5.05 a case for pickles. This is the same thing, of
course, as a $.01 reduction in the per pound price of garlic. But making this
cut in the price of garlic in the form of higher prices paid for pickles has its
advantages as far as Gentry is concerned. Firstly, Gentry has obtained an
additional and profitable piece of garlic business. Gentry is selling to GP
garlic for $.09 per pound that costs only $.06 a pound to produce and deliver;
it still maintains the price of garlic to its other customers at $.10 per pound.
In the second place, the open or posted price of garlic remains unchanged.
It is thus more difficult for Basic and for other customers of Gentry to
observe that in fact the price of Gentry's garlic has been reduced in the case
of the sale to GP. This should postpone a response by Basic and, in any
event, as noted above, avoids the loss of revenue that would attend an across28
the-board cut that included its old customers.
J. BAIN, PRIcE THEORY 403 (1952).
26 d. at 294. See also note 21 supra and accompanying text.
27 Basic's inability to match Gentry's cuts immediately after observing them produces
much the same result as a failure to observe those cuts in the first instance. The more
"secret"- i.e., unmatchable without imposing additional cost - Gentry's cuts, the more
likely Gentry is to make them, the greater the pressure on Basic to respond, and the
greater the likelihood that the entire oligopolistic price structure will be disrupted.
28 See J. BAIN, supra note 25, at 403.
25See
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Perhaps even more interesting, cutting garlic prices by paying higher
than competitive prices for reciprocally purchased pickles puts Basic in a
difficult position as to what to do after it discovers that Gentry has in fact
been cutting garlic prices. Basic can attempt to counter the competitive
reciprocal buying attack that Gentry has made by trying to do the same
thing. It could attempt to find a merger partner like Consolidated, thereby
putting itself in the same position as Gentry to engage in reciprocity, i.e.,
to cut garlic prices on a selective basis. Or it could contract for the purchase
of pickles at higher than competitive prices, just as Consolidated-Gentry did,
and then sell those pickles in the open market, taking a loss of $.05 per case,
just as Consolidated-Gentry would have to on the resale of pickles it buys
from GP.29

In the long run it should cost Basic no more to do either of these things
than it has cost Gentry. 30 But the response will take time and in that time
Gentry will presumably be making hay.81
Basic, of course, could respond immediately with an open cut in garlic
prices. This would, however, impose the cost of revenue losses on all garlic
business which Basic has been doing at $.10 per pound. We might thus
expect Basic to be somewhat reluctant at first, although, depending on the
extent to which Gentry pushes this business of reciprocally made price cuts,
Basic may eventually be forced to do so.
It is important to note that any open price cut that Basic makes in
response to Gentry's selectively made reciprocal buying cuts will force
Gentry to follow suit. Should Gentry also respond with more selectively
made reciprocity cuts, the point will come where the price of garlic will
approximate its production cost, the level we would expect to find under
29See Comment, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020, 1023 n.16 (1967).
30 There is no reason to believe that Consolidated is the only or the best merger
partner in a situation such as this, should Basic try to respond through merger. Nor
is there any reason to think that merger is more desirable than the contract situation
mentioned in the text. In fact the opposite may be true. See Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (NS) 386 (1937), reprinted in 6 Am. ECON. ASS'N, READINGS IN PRicE
THEORY 331 (1952). In any event, as the immediately following discussion will show,
Basic can solve the whole problem by moving to lower garlic and onion prices at more
competitive levels. This would seem to be more appropriate from a social point of view
than to complain to the FTC that competition is beginning to break out in the industry and enlisting that agency's aid in stamping it out. (I am only surmising that
this is how the FTC became interested in this particular case. I would, however, be
willing to bet on the proposition, and in any event the result is the same.)
Of this sort of thing, Professor Posner has said:
Proceeding against a competitior by way of a complaint to the Trade Commission
• . . is a method of imposing the cost of litigation on the competitor at no cost
to the complainant. All of the costs of prosecution are borne by the FTC; all of
the costs of defense by the respondent. The complainant pays nothing. This
arrangement creates an incentive to engage in litigation designed purely to suppress competition, for it enables the complaining party to create a barrier to
entry in its exact technical sense: a condition that imposes upon a new entrant
a cost not borne by firms already in the market.
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STuDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 108-09 (1969)
(statement of Richard A. Posner) (footnote omitted).
31 See J. BAIN, supra note 25, at 274; Liebeler, supra note 20, at 1161.
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competitive conditions.8 2 Far from reinforcing an oligopolistic market
structure, as the Court and FTC claimed it would, reciprocity in this case
could well, indeed most likely would, disrupt the oligopolistic price structure and greatly increase competition in the garlic industry.
It is also worth noting that as competitive conditions are approached in
the garlic market, the use of reciprocity would decline and tend to disappear
entirely.33 For example, if Gentry used reciprocal buying arrangements to
obtain an appreciable amount of Basic's garlic business we would expect
Basic eventually to respond with an open price cut of, say, $.01 per pound
of garlic. Gentry would have to follow this cut on all its non-reciprocity
business and in addition increase the price it was paying GP for pickles to
$5.10 per case in order to maintain the $.01 per pound differential with
84
which it had been favoring GP. Assuming no changes in marginal cost,
Gentry would now be selling garlic to GP for $.08 per pound at a cost of
$.06 per pound; the reciprocity arrangement would still pay. But if competition continues to drive the price of garlic down, to its cost of $.06 per pound,
Consolidated-Gentry would become indifferent as to how it made its price
cut to GP. There would no longer be any advantage to paying more for
J. BAIN, supra note 25, at 126.
3sSee FTC REPORT at 323-24; Comment, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE LJ. 1020,
1027 (1967).
84 Actually we would expect Gentry's marginal costs to rise as it increased output
concomitantly with selective price cuts made by reciprocal dealing. This, of course,
would tend to hasten the demise of reciprocity, which should theoretically disappear
when price and marginal cost come together. A rising marginal cost curve would also
limit Gentry's ability to drive Basic from the market, even if it employed ordinary
"cross subsidization," "disciplinary-repressive cross subsidization" or even more esoteric
devices in its never ending attempt to monopolize the garlic market. See FTC REPORT
at 398, 421.
It is hard to believe that the FTC staff is still arguing against the legality of conglomerate mergers on the basis of the theory on which the old Ab'P case was based.
See United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949). This so-called cross-subsidization theory has been as thoroughly discredited as
any theory could be. See Adelman, The A&P Case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q.J. ECON. 238 (1949). This whole thing is particularly ironic to one viewing
the world from the vantage point of southern California, which was one of the two
their operdistricts in which the A&P kept operating its stores at a loss -subsidizing
ations, of course, by increasing their margins in Brooklyn and elsewhere. There are no
more A&P stores in southern California, or at least none that I can find. Apparently
even cross-subsidization has its limits as a device for gaining monopoly power. The
possibility that competition ever forces anyone to operate at a loss is apparently something that does not occur to some people. In any event, the A&P never did get a
monopoly on the grocery business in Los Angeles.
And for those more devoted to idolatry than to rationality, which seems to be more
than a few when it comes to antitrust policy, it is worth noting that the absurdity of
the A&P theory is something on which Professor Galbraith, the Chicago People, Donald
Turner, and at least a part of the Supreme Court appear to agree. Cf. J. GALBRAIT,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 148 (1952); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.)
Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1340 (1965), cited with seeming approval by Mr.
Justice Harlan in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). This in itself is enough to give one pause. ...
32 See, e.g.,
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pickles in order to cut garlic prices. Consolidated-Gentry would just as soon
sell its garlic to GP for $.06 per pound and buy pickles at the competitive
price of $5.00 per case, either from Glor from any other pickle manufacturer
who might be interested.
Under our hypothetical, Consolidated-Gentry would never pay more
than $5.20 for a case of pickles.35 After that the usefulness of reciprocity
would disappear. This would result, of course, from the competition that
was introduced into the garlic market by reciprocity in the first place. We
might conclude, therefore, that reciprocity of this type carries the seeds of
its own destruction.
The fact that Consolidated may exercise buying, countervailing or
monopsony power 6 in the pickle market, or may be buying pickles from GP
prior to the institution of reciprocal dealing does not affect the conclusions
of the above analysis. Suppose that Consolidated does have such power.
It uses it against GP and before reciprocity with respect to garlic is instituted
Consolidated is getting pickles for $4.50 per case, rather than the $5.00 it
would be paying in the absence of that power. We should be able to
assume that Consolidated has exercised all of its power against GP, since it
is in its economic interest to do so, and that it is unable to reduce the price
of pickles below $4.50 per case. If Consolidated offers $4.49 or tries to
impose any other costs on GP in connection with pickle purchases, Consolidated will not get any GP pickles. GP will simply go elsewhere with its
pickles, or in the extreme case may stop making them altogether.
As the "leverage" theory would have it, the fact that Consolidated has
buying power of some kind gives it the power to impose some additional
cost on GP, over and above the $.50 reduction in pickle prices it has already
obtained with this power 8 7 Under this theory this cost is imposed by
35
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5.25
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A price of $5.20 for a case of pickles would preserve the $.01 cut in garlic prices
which Consolidated-Gentry had extended to GP (at the point when the general market
price of garlic had dropped to $.07 per pound). Gentry would be earning only a competitive rate of return in respect of sales made at this price ($.06). It presumably would
not go below this point, as an out of pocket loss would ,result.
36 In spite of the happy unanimity described in note 34 supra, any discussion of the
nature or even of the existence of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this note.
87The fact that some small pickle makers had gone out of business or merged with
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"forcing" GP to buy garlic from Gentry when it would prefer, presumably
for good economic reasons, to buy from Basic.
It has been well argued that thisocannot be done.88 There is no obvious
way in which Consolidated's acquisition of Gentry can increase its buying
power in the pickle market. There is no question, however, that the practice
of reciprocity can have much the same effect as a vertical merger between
the firms engaging in the practice, in this case Gentry and its pickle-making
garlic customer. 39 This will make it possible for Gentry to engage in more
flexible pricing practices after its merger with Consolidated, but this has
nothing to do with Consolidated's power in the pickle market.
If Consolidated's buying power in the pickle market is not increased by
the Gentry acquisition, then the only way Consolidated-Gentry can induce
GP to switch its garlic purchases from Basic to Gentry is by cutting garlic
prices. The situation is, in short, the same as though Consolidated did not
exercise any buying power in the pickle market. The garlic price cut can
now be made, of course, by increasing the price Consolidated pays for GP
pickles from $4.50 to $4.55 per case, rather than increasing that price from
$5.00 to $5.05. Garlic prices are cut, in other words, whenever Consolidated
forgoes a lower price for pickles.
Consolidated, of course, can be viewed in such a case as transferring its
market (buying) power from the pickle market to the garlic market. While
this is true in a sense, it is no more true in the case where Consolidated
exercises buying power than in the case where it does not. 0 In our first
larger firms seems to have been the basis of Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence in Consolidated Foods. 580 U.S. at 608. But it would seem that the fact that some pickle makers
merged "can rest on so many alternative hypotheses that it is persuasive as to none."
Id. at 605.
38 Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281,
290 (1956). While, 13 years later, this idea has managed to creep sneakily into a footnote
in a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, its implications -which
are broad indeed- for antitrust policy are not yet generally recognized. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512 n.3 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). See also
Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 103, 105. Even if the Gentry
acquisition does in some way increase Consolidated's "buying" or "countervailing power"
in the pickle market, there is no reason to assume that this will have any anticompetitive effect. Any use of this hypothetically increased power would result in lower input
(pickle) prices to Consolidated. Since Consolidated's marginal cost has gone down its
output should rise and pickle eaters should be happier. This would be a perfect example
of a socially desirable use of "countervailing power," [J. GALBRAITH, supra note 54, at 125],
which has in some contexts at least been met with the approval of the FTC. See FTC,
ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS & VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY 110 (1966).

89 Reciprocity is, of course, a contractual vertical merger. The implications of this
in terms of output and pricing are particularly interesting when the firms engaging in
reciprocity both exercise market power.
40 See Liebeler, supra note 20. If output is being restricted in the pickle market,
Consolidated-Gentry may have an advantage over Basic and other garlic makers who
are not in a short-run position to buy pickles. This advantage would result if the cost
imposed on Consolidated-Gentry by shifting (or refraining from shifting) from one
pickle supplier to another is less than the advantage gained by a particular pickle
maker by increasing (or refraining from reducing) his output as a result of more- or
continued-sales of pickles to Consolidated. In such a case the effective reduction in
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hypothetical Consolidated had the "power," as did everyone else, to buy
pickles for $5.00 per case. When it pays $5.05 a case for pickles, instead of
$5.00, we could say that it has transformed its pickle power into garlic power,
but we would not have said very much. The same is true if it pays $4.55 for
pickles when it could have gotten them for $4.50. In either case, the net
result of the reciprocal transaction should be regarded as a reduction in the
41
price of garlic.
Are there any facts, either in the Consolidated record or elsewhere, that
support this interpretation of reciprocity? There is an almost ancient
garlic prices to the pickle maker (the benefit resulting from the sale of pickles to Consolidated) will be greater than the cost to Consolidated-Gentry of granting such a reduction in garlic prices.
While this could be called "leverage," it has nothing to do with buying power on
Consolidated's part; it would exist even if there were perfect competition in the wholesale grocery market, i.e., no "buying power" of any kind in that market. For example,
suppose there are only three firms making pickles (A, B and C); parallel pricing practices
result in a price of $6.00 per case of pickles which have a marginal cost of $4.50 per
case. Suppose that Consolidated has been buying all its pickles from A and that it will
cost Consolidated $.50 per case more (because of transport or other such factors) to buy
from B and C. Assuming constant marginal costs in pickle making, it seems clear that a
shift of some pickle purchases to B and C will benefit each of those firms to the extent
of $1.50 per case; it will cost Consolidated only $.50 per case to effect this benefit.
If B and C can sell more pickles as a result and only as a result of buying garlic
from Gentry, they should realistically regard the $1.50 benefit per case of pickles sold
as an effective reduction in the price of garlic. Their shift of garlic purchases from Basic
to Gentry will have precisely the same effect as any other indirect reduction in garlic
prices, i.e., it will increase the pressures on Basic and other competitors of Gentry to
compete more effectively. There is an additional advantage in this situation in that
Gentry will be more inclined to engage in reciprocity than if the benefit given to its
garlic-buying pickle makers resulted in the imposition of costs on Consolidated that
equalled the benefits granted, i.e., in our example, $1.50 per case of pickles. This being
the case, competitive conditions should appear in the garlic market sooner rather than
later.
It is worth noting that the advantage that Gentry appears to have in the situation
described above will tend to disappear as garlic prices approach a competitive level. Unless there are no additional costs to Consolidated of doing business with B and C rather
than A (a situation that would appear to be unlikely), as the price of garlic goes to
marginal cost it will cease to be profitable for Consolidated-Gentry to engage in
reciprocity with B and C. Basic and other competitors of Gentry will then be in a position to compete on the basis of quality, services, etc., as they were before reciprocity was
introduced. The only difference will be that garlic prices will be lower, a supposed advantage to consumers which the antitrust laws should encourage rather than prevent.
In spite of the possibilities discussed in this note, the treatment in the text has been
confined'to the situation where Consolidated actually pays the pickle maker a higher
price for pickles. The principles involved seem easier to understand in that context. And
in terms of the effect on the garlic and onion market, there is no difference between
the two cases: a benefit is being conferred on the pickle maker to induce him to buy
Gentry garlic and the benefit seems most sensibly viewed as an indirect reduction in
garlic prices.
41For some reason many apparently otherwise intelligent people seem to have
trouble translating increased pickle prices into lower garlic prices. But for this the
point would not be worth laboring. Perhaps it is simpler to regard Consolidated's conduct as conferring a net benefit on the firm with which it engages in reciprocal dealing.
As the discussion below shows, however, businessmen do not seem to have any difficulty
in grasping the point.
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indication that firms engaging in reciprocity know that any increase in
price on articles purchased is in effect a reduction in price (net return) on
the article that is sold as a result of the purchase. The New York Times,
on November 6, 1932, in recounting the development of reciprocal buying
in the early 1930's, stated that:
As the scheme developed in importance and size and necessitated
higher costs . . .it became expedient to turn it over to the purchasing
departments. The plan worked smoothly for a while . . . but here again
the higher prices paid for goods in reciprocal agreements became a
troublesome subject. Recently it was decided by the majority of companies
to charge the difference in the cost of products to sales expense when
reciprocity was involved. In this manner the extra expense is definitely
charged to one department and the added cost brings to sales divisions2
4
a realization of their responsibility in making reciprocal agreements.

Another striking example of the awareness of firms that increased
prices on articles bought means reduced prices on the articles reciprocally
sold appears in an internal memorandum of the United States Rubber
Company dealing with possible reciprocal arrangements with the United
States Steel Company:
For several years we have purchased in the neighborhood of $400,000 to
$700,000 in merchandise from the U.S. Steel Corporation and subsidiaries.
During the same time the United States Rubber Company and subsidiaries
(primarily the Mechanical Department) have sold merchandise to the
extent of about $300,000 annually. One of the large items in money value
purchased by us from the Steel Corporation is sulphate of ammonia for
use as fertilizer on our Plantations in the Far East. A situation has arisen
this year where the best quotation obtainable for our requirements from
the Steel Corp'n is $6,478 in excess of a quotation for a satisfactory
fertilizer of German production.... Knowing the valuable account Mr.
Gussenhoven's Department has with the Steel Corp'n and the close relations he has maintained with them, the Purchasing Department felt that
before giving our fertilizer business to a foreign competitor, it was better
for the Company to ask Mr. Gussenhoven to consider this question from
two angles: first, whether or not he could get the Steel Corp'n to meet the
foreign offer and, second, in case he were unsuccessful, Mr. Gussenhoven
to decide if the value of his sales account was sufficiently important to
warrant his agreeing to absorb the $6,478 difference so as not to penalize
the Plantations Company. The so-called machinery to carry this particular
example out is now being used, although a definite decision has not been
reached. Many other similar situations will arise, in fact, there are several
now reported as needing such handling by the Purchasing Department.s
One is almost embarrassed to note the comment of a former Chief of
the Evaluation Section, Antitrust Division, on all of this. He has characterized the practice of "charging off part of a company's payments in
42 Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. CHI.
73, 87 n.64 (1957), quoting N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,1932, § 4 (Financial c Business), at 8,
col. 6.
43 Stocking & Mueller, supra note 42, at 86-87.
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purchase of goods as a selling cost of the reciprocal business" as "a curious
accounting device." 44 It appears to be "curious" only in the sense that it
accurately reflects reality. But then in the world portrayed by much of
current antitrust doctrine, that may indeed be the true definition of
"curious."
The use of reciprocity as a surreptitious price cutting device can be
seen clearly in the early railroad cases involving the routing of meat
shipments and the purchase of draft gears. These cases brook no interpretation other than that a selective reduction in rail rates was being granted to
large meat shippers by the railroads involved. 6 Reciprocity has also been
used to obtain reductions from prices dictated by the uniform commission
schedule of the New York Stock Exchange, especially in connection with
large transactions executed on behalf of institutional investors. 46 The price
cutting aspects involved in the railroad and stock exchange situations are
among the clearest examples of how reciprocity is used to reduce prices,
because direct or open price cutting is prohibited in those situations respectively, by ICC regulation 47 and the rules of the stock exchanges. 4s Similar
restraints on open downward price movement may, however, exist as a
result of cartel agreements or of oligopolistic market structures. 49
Any doubts that might have existed about the fact that reciprocity is
used as a device for clandestinely reducing prices by paying higher prices
for reciprocally purchased items are removed by the recent FTC Economic
Report on Corporate Mergers. That Report states: "We have seen that

companies frequently pay premium prices or accept lower quality when
reciprocity is a factor in making a sale."' 50 Examples included an excerpt
from an Atlantic Richfield trade relations manual which outlined buyers'
44Kestenbaum, supra note 2, at 578.
45Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232
(1931); Reciprocity in Purchasing and Routing, 188 I.C.C. 417 (1932).
46Especially enlightening is Professor Marsh's description of this situation. See
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRIams REGULATxON 694-700 (1968).
47 See authorities cited in note 45 supra.
45 N.Y.S.E. CONST., art. XV, § 2. Professor Stigler notes that reciprocity "is important
chiefly where prices are fixed by the state or a cartel." Stigler, supra note 3, at 52.
49 Professor Stigler does not emphasize the importance of reciprocity in oligopolistic
market structures, probably because of his persuasion as to the extent to which effective
oligopoly pricing can be practiced in the current economy. It is worth noting, however,
that if reciprocity is as rampant as some people think, we may learn from that something about the extent to which we are plagued by oligopolistic pricing. In any event,
the persistence of reciprocity in an industry should serve as warning flag as to the
absence of effective competition. The railroads provide a striking example. It is said that
reciprocity is "traditional" on the American railroads. Backman, supra at p. 95. It may also
be noted that regulatory policy in this area is a national scandal. See A. FRIEDLANDER,
THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION (1969); Boies, Experiment In Mercantilism: Minimum Rate Regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 68
COLUm. L. REv. 599 (1968). Would it not make more sense to limit or abolish rate
regulation, thereby permitting a little competition, rather than to joust with the symptoms?
50 FTC REPORT at 387.
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procedures for selecting vendors. According to this manual, buyers were to
place business with the bidder offering the lowest cost "unless other factors
including trade relations, make it advisable to pay a higher price." 51 In
connection with General Tire's selection of a freight carrier, the Report
advises:
So firm was the reciprocity basis for General Tire's freight commitments
that it was said to favor truck shipments even when they were costlier
than rail. As another Southern [Railroad] official described the situation,
the lower cost hauler had to provide other advantages in addition to lower
freight rates in order to compete with trucking firms for General's shipments.... In this instance, reciprocity existed with both potential shipping
companies [the railroad and the trucking firms], and although a cost
conscious business man might reasonably be expected to choose between its
reciprocity suppliers on the basis of the relative cost to him of their
services, it is clear from the correspondence that General Tire's decision
was based on the trade balance theory.52
The General Tire case is more complicated than Consolidated Foods.
And while the economic analysis of vertical relations provides a very good
explanation of why a cost conscious business might be expected to do exactly
the opposite of what the above quote suggests, 53 the important point here
is that firms apparently do at times pay higher prices for reciprocal business
than they would have to pay for comparable services from others. If this
payment of higher prices is viewed as the equivalent of a selective cut in
the price of the items sold by the reciprocal dealing firm as a result of the
higher prices it pays on the reciprocal business, it is difficult to understand
the argument that reciprocity distorts market processes by intruding "'an
irrelevant and alien factor' . . . into the choice among competing produCtS ....

-54

In another article in this Symposium, the Honorable Mary Gardner
Jones correctly states that:
To assess the anticompetitive effect of actual reciprocity, we need to
know for a sample of industries where reciprocity is an observed practice
whether it brings with it any changes toward a more anticompetitive
market structure and worsened economic performance, e.g., [inter alia]
whether prices have become more rigid or more flexible. .... 55
51id. (emphasis omitted).
52 Id. at 390.
53 See Liebeler, supra note 20.
54 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
55Jones & Heiden, Conglomerates: The Need for Rational Policy Making, supra,
at p. 243. While Commissioner Jones seems happy with the results of cases such as
Consolidated Foods, she also contends that any final judgments on the effects of reciprocity must await further study. The only problem with this is that she seems to have
in mind further study by the FTC Staff. The ABA Commission on the FTC was quite
blunt on this point, stating that "it will be impossible for it [the FTC] to implement
present programs effectively, let alone institute the programs proposed in this report,
unless it attracts new personnel of high quality." Summing up, the ABA Commission
noted that: "With respect to senior staff, a majority of the present FTC Commissioners
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In the context of our argument that reciprocity is many times used to
effect indirect price cuts, therefore making prices more flexible (presumably
a pro-competitive phenomenon), let us look at what actually happened in the
dehydrated onion and garlic market after the Consolidated-Gentry merger
and the institution of reciprocity. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice
Stewart pointed out that competition seemed to increase in that market after
the merger:
There is evidence that in the years following 1951, when the merger
took place, increased emphasis was placed on solving technical problems
which had prevented some processors from relying on dehydrated, rather
than raw, onions. The 1950's were a time of flux for the industry. Basic
was sometimes the innovator of technological change leading to increased
sales; sometimes Gentry had the upper hand. It is possible that this
shift to more intensive competition was connected with the merger.
Faced with a new competitive situation, Basic may have determined to
solve quality control problems which had long been dormant. Indeed,
the evidence seems to show that, after the acquisition, the industry reflected the salutary qualities normally associated with free competition.
Overall, both Basic and Gentry were furnishing a better product at the
end of this period than at the beginning. 56
Even more significant behavior on Basic's part, which is revealed by an
examination of the Consolidated record, does not seem to have been much
noted in the growing literature on reciprocity. It appears that after Consolidated-Gentry began to engage in reciprocal dealing, Basic opened more
warehouses, added to its sales force, improved service to its customers and
added new products to its line. 57 It also restructured its price schedules to
introduce more flexibility, specifically to meet the increased competition
from Gentry.5 s The importance of these facts cannot be overemphasized. It
appears that in some way the Consolidated-Gentry merger contributed
greatly to increased competition in the dehydrated onion and garlic market. 59
advised us that some bureau and division chiefs are incompetent."

REPORT OF THE ABA
TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 32-33 (1969). If the recent FTC
Report is any example, the ABA Commission has understated the problem. In Professor
MacAvoy's opinion, the FTC staff Merger Report is a "shambles of half-finished arguments and incomplete documentation . . . that can only raise again the questions asked
last year about staff quality and administration." ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 447,
at A-8 (Feb. 3, 1970). Other recent efforts of the FTC staff have been little, if any, better.
See Liebeler, supra note 20 [commenting on FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS & VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY (1966)].
56 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1965).
57Record at 303, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
58d. at 312. It is interesting to note that in its eastern territory, Basic shifted from
an f.o.b. plant pricing system to a combination of f.o.b. plant and f.o.b. customer system. This in itself would appear to be a shift toward greater pricing flexibility and may
COMMISION

have involved discriminatory price cutting in the form of freight absorption, although

it is not possible to tell from the Record.
59 Mr. Robert Sparling, representing the Basic sales office, specifically testified that
competition from Gentry had increased after the merger. Record at 303-04. The basic

concern of counsel for the FTC seemed to be that Basic had lost some business to Gentry.
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We do not know for sure that this resulted entirely from reciprocity-effected
price cuts by Gentry, but the evidence is at the very least consistent with this
hypothesis. And this hypothesis seems to be a great deal more consistent with
the facts than any other that has been offered so far.
If this interpretation of Consolidated Foods is correct, reciprocity
appears to have had a profoundly pro-competitive effect. It seems to have
resulted in disruption of the oligopolistic price structure of the dehydrated
onion and garlic market, brought about increased customer service and
reduced prices. This is, or should be, precisely the goal of any rational
antitrust policy.
I am not prepared to say that reciprocity is socially desirable in any and
all situations. The subject needs a great deal more investigation in terms of
its effect in different market situations. Additional analysis by way of
analogy to the vertical merger situation needs to be made. It seems more
than safe to say, however, that those who glibly assume the practice to be
an unmitigated evil are doing us precious little service indeed. In the
meantime we would do well to halt the march against conglomerate mergers
on the basis of the supposed anticompetitive effects of reciprocity.
If this is enough to outlaw a merger, as it almost seems to be, then we really are in
trouble.

